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ABSTRACT
Cybercriminals steal access credentials to online accounts
and then misuse them for their own profit, release them pub-
licly, or sell them on the underground market. Despite the
importance of this problem, the research community still
lacks a comprehensive understanding of what these stolen
accounts are used for. In this paper, we aim to shed light
on the modus operandi of miscreants accessing stolen Gmail
accounts. We developed an infrastructure that is able to mon-
itor the activity performed by users on Gmail accounts, and
leaked credentials to 100 accounts under our control through
various means, such as having information-stealing malware
capture them, leaking them on public paste sites, and posting
them on underground forums. We then monitored the activ-
ity recorded on these accounts over a period of 7 months.
Our observations allowed us to devise a taxonomy of mali-
cious activity performed on stolen Gmail accounts, to iden-
tify differences in the behavior of cybercriminals that get ac-
cess to stolen accounts through different means, and to iden-
tify systematic attempts to evade the protection systems in
place at Gmail and blend in with the legitimate user activ-
ity. This paper gives the research community a better under-
standing of a so far understudied, yet critical aspect of the
cybercrime economy.
1. INTRODUCTION
The wealth of information that users store in accounts
on online services such as Gmail, Dropbox, and Face-
book, as well as the possibility of misusing them for
illicit activities have attracted cybercriminals, who ac-
tively engage in compromising such accounts. Miscre-
ants obtain the credentials to victims’ online accounts
by performing phishing scams [13], by infecting users
with information-stealing malware [23] or by compro-
mising the databases of websites that contain such in-
formation [5]. Such credentials are then sold on the
black market to other cybercriminals who wish to use
the stolen accounts for profit. This ecosystem has be-
come a very sophisticated market in which only vetted
sellers are allowed to join [24].
Cybercriminals can use compromised accounts in mul-
tiple ways. First, they can use them to send spam [14].
This practice is particularly effective because of the
established reputation of such accounts: the already-
established contacts of the account are likely to trust
its owner, and are therefore more likely to open the
messages that they receive from her [16]. Similarly, the
stolen account is likely to have a history of good behav-
ior with the online service, and the malicious messages
sent by it are therefore less likely to be detected as spam,
especially if the recipients are within the same service
(e.g., a Gmail account used to send spam to other Gmail
accounts) [27]. Because of these advantages, the devel-
opers of large spamming botnets include the opportu-
nity to instruct their bots to use stolen webmail service
accounts to deliver spam [24]. Alternatively, cybercrim-
inals can use the stolen accounts to collect sensitive in-
formation about the victim. Such information can in-
clude financial credentials (credit card numbers, bank
account numbers), login information to other online ser-
vices, and personal communications of the victim [11].
Despite the importance of stolen accounts for the
underground economy, there is surprisingly little work
on the topic. Bursztein et al. [11] studied the modus
operandi of cybercriminals collecting Gmail account cre-
dentials through phishing scams. Their paper shows
that criminals access these accounts to steal financial
information from their victims, or use these accounts to
send fraudulent emails. Despite the interesting insights,
the narrowness of their threat model keeps many ques-
tions unanswered. Other researchers did not attempt
studying the activity of criminals on compromised on-
line accounts because it is usually difficult to monitor
what happens to them without being a large online ser-
vice. The rare exceptions are studies that look at infor-
mation that is publicly observable, such as the messages
shared on Twitter by compromised accounts [14,15].
To close this gap, in this paper we present a system
that is able to monitor the activity performed by at-
tackers on Gmail accounts. To this end, we instrument
the accounts by using Google Apps Script [1]; by doing
so, we are able to monitor any time an email is read, fa-
1
vorited, sent, or a new draft is created. We also monitor
the accesses that the accounts receive, with particular
attention to their system configuration and their origin.
We call such accounts honey accounts. To allow re-
searchers to set up their own honeypot infrastructures,
we will release the source code of our honey account
system publicly.
We set up 100 honey accounts, each resembling the
Gmail account of the employee of a fictitious company.
To understand how criminals use these accounts af-
ter they get compromised, we leak the credentials to
such accounts on multiple outlets, modeling the differ-
ent ways in which cybercriminals share and get access
to such credentials. First, we leak credentials on paste
sites, such as pastebin [4]. Paste sites are commonly
used by cybercriminals to post account credentials after
data breaches [2]. We also leak them to underground fo-
rums, which have been shown to be the place where cy-
bercriminals gather to trade stolen commodities such as
account credentials [24]. Finally, we login to our honey
accounts on virtual machines that have been previously
infected with information stealing malware. By doing
this, the credentials will be sent to the cybercriminal be-
hind the command and control infrastructure, and will
then be used directly or placed on the black market for
sale [23]. We know that there are other outlets that
attackers use, for instance, phishing and data breaches,
but we decided to focus on the paste sites, underground
forums, and malware in this paper. We worked in close
collaboration with the Google anti-abuse team, to make
sure that any unwanted activity by the compromised ac-
counts would be promptly blocked. The accounts are
configured to send any email to a mail server under
our control, to prevent them from successfully deliver-
ing spam.
After leaking our credentials, we recorded any inter-
action with our honey accounts for a period of 7 months.
Our analysis allows us to draw a taxonomy of the dif-
ferent actions performed by criminals on stolen Gmail
accounts, as well as provide us interesting insights on
the keywords that criminals typically search for when
looking for valuable information on these accounts. We
also show that criminals who obtain access to stolen ac-
counts through certain outlets appear more skilled than
others, and make additional efforts to avoid detection
from Gmail. For instance, criminals who steal account
credentials via malware make more efforts to hide their
identity, by connecting from open proxies and the Tor
network and disguising their browser user agent. Crim-
inals who obtain access to stolen credentials through
paste sites, on the other hand, tend to connect to these
accounts from locations that are close to the typical
location used by the owner of the account, if this infor-
mation is shared with them. At the lowest level of so-
phistication are criminals who browse free underground
forums looking for free samples of stolen accounts: these
individuals do not take significant measures to avoid de-
tection, and are therefore easier to detect and block.
In summary, this paper makes the following contri-
butions:
• We develop a system to monitor the activity of
Gmail accounts. We will publicly release the source
code of our system, to allow other researchers to
deploy their own Gmail honey accounts and fur-
ther the understanding that the security commu-
nity has of malicious activity on online services.
• We deployed 100 honey accounts on Gmail, and
leaked credentials through three different outlets:
underground forums, public paste sites, and vir-
tual machines infected with information-stealing
malware.
• We provide detailed measurements of the activ-
ity logged by our honey accounts over a period of
7 months. We show that certain outlets on which
credentials are leaked appear to be used by more
skilled criminals, who act stealthy and actively at-
tempt to evade detection systems.
2. BACKGROUND
Webmail accounts. Webmail service providers such
as Gmail, Yahoo!, and Outlook.com provide their users
with a convenient place to store, sort, and manage their
emails and contacts. In this paper we focus on Gmail
accounts, with particular attention to the actions per-
formed by cybercriminals once they obtain access to
someone else’s account. We made this choice because
Gmail allows users to set up scripts that augment the
functionality of their accounts, and it was therefore the
ideal platform for developing webmail–based honeypots.
To ease the understanding of the rest of this paper, we
briefly summarize the capabilities offered by webmail
accounts in general, and by Gmail in particular.
In Gmail, after logging in, users are presented with a
view of their inbox. The inbox contains all the emails
that the user received, and highlights the ones that have
not been read yet by displaying them in boldface font.
Users have the possibility to mark emails that are im-
portant to them and that need particular attention by
starring them. Users are also given a search functional-
ity, which allows them to find emails of interest by typ-
ing related keywords. They are also given the possibility
to organize their email by placing related messages in
folders, or assigning them descriptive labels. Such op-
erations can be automated by creating rules that auto-
matically process received emails. When writing emails,
content is saved in a Drafts folder until the user decides
to send it. Once this happens, sent emails can be found
in a dedicated folder, and they can be searched similarly
to what happens for received emails.
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Threat model. Cybercriminals can get access to ac-
count credentials in three ways. First, they can per-
form social engineering-based scams, such as setting up
phishing web pages that resemble the login page of pop-
ular online services [13] or sending spearphishing emails
pretending to be members of customer support teams
at such online services [26]. As a second way of obtain-
ing user credentials, cybercriminals can install malware
on victim computers and configure it to report back any
account credentials typed by the user to the command
and control server of the botnet [23]. As a third way of
obtaining access to user credentials, cybercriminals can
exploit vulnerabilities in the databases used by online
services to store them [5].
After stealing account credentials, a cybercriminal
can either use them privately for his own profit, re-
lease them publicly, or sell them on the underground
market. Previous work studied the modus operandi of
cybercriminals stealing user accounts through phishing
and using them privately [11]. In this work, we study
a broader threat model in which we mimic cybercrim-
inals leaking credentials on paste sites [4] as well as
miscreants advertising them for sale on underground
forums [24]. In particular, previous research showed
that cybercriminals often offer a small number of ac-
count credentials for free to test their “quality.” We
followed a similar approach, pretending to have more
accounts for sale, but never following up to any further
inquiries. In addition, we simulate infected victim ma-
chines in which the malware steals the user’s credentials
and sends them to the cybercriminal. We describe our
setup and how we leaked account credentials on each
outlet in detail in Section 3.2.
Finally, there are a number of actions that a cyber-
criminal who obtains access to a victim account can
perform. Such actions include sending spam [14] or col-
lecting sensitive information from the account [11]. In
Section 3.1 we describe how we developed an infras-
tructure to monitor the activity of cybercriminals on
our honey accounts, while in Section 4.2 we analyze in
detail the types of activity that we observed.
3. METHODOLOGY
Our overall goal was to gain a better understanding
of malicious activity in compromised webmail accounts.
To achieve this goal, we developed a system able to
monitor the activity on Gmail accounts. We instru-
mented these accounts to log all accesses they receive,
and actions taken on them by cybercriminals. We set
up a monitor infrastructure to keep track of this activity
information. We then deployed 100 honey accounts on
Gmail. We proceeded to leak the accounts on different
outlets, namely popular paste websites, underground fo-
rums, and information-stealing malware. The idea is to
study differences in malicious activity across these out-
lets. In the following section, we describe our system
architecture and our experiment setup in detail.
3.1 System overview
Our system comprises a number of components, namely,
honey accounts and monitor infrastructure. These com-
ponents are described in this section.
Honey accounts. Our honey accounts are webmail ac-
counts instrumented with Google Apps Script, to mon-
itor activity in them. Google Apps Script is a cloud-
based scripting language based on JavaScript, origi-
nally designed to augment the functionality of Gmail
accounts and Google Drive documents, in addition to
building web apps [3]. Google Apps Script provides
APIs for performing time-triggered and event-triggered
tasks, for instance, sending an email reminder once ev-
ery day, about emails marked “important.” We incor-
porated scripts into each account to monitor the emails
in the account honeypots. The scripts send notifica-
tions to a dedicated webmail account under our control
whenever an email is read, sent or “starred.” In ad-
dition to information on actions taken on emails, the
scripts also send copies of all draft emails created in the
honey accounts to us.
We included functions to scan the emails in each
honey account every 10 minutes, to report all discovered
changes, namely, read, sent, starred and draft emails,
back to us. We also added a “heartbeat message” func-
tion, to send us a predefined message once a day from
each honey account, to attest that the account was still
functional and had not been blocked by Google. The
Google Apps Script was well hidden in a Google Docs
Spreadsheet stored in the honey accounts. We believe
that this measure makes it unlikely for attackers to find
and delete our scripts. To minimize abuse, we changed
each honeypot account’s default send-from address to
an email address pointing to a modified mailserver un-
der our control. All emails sent from the account hon-
eypots are delivered to the mailserver, which simply
dumps the emails to disk and does not forward them to
the intended destination.
Monitoring infrastructure. Google Apps Scripts are
quite powerful, but they do not provide enough infor-
mation in some cases. For example, they do not pro-
vide information about the location of IP addresses of
accesses to webmail accounts. To keep track of such
accesses, we set up scripts to drive a web browser and
periodically login to each honey account, and record
information about visitors (cookie identifier, geoloca-
tion information and times of accesses, among others).
The scripts navigate to the visitor activity pages in the
honey accounts, and dump the pages to disk, for oﬄine
parsing. It is interesting to note that by taking advan-
tage of the Gmail activity page we are able to leverage
Google’s geolocation system, as well as their operating
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system fingerprinting techniques. In addition, notifica-
tions of actions on honey accounts are sent to a dedi-
cated webmail account we set up as a notifications store.
The notifications are sent by Google Apps Scripts and
retrieved by another script managed by us.
We believe that our honey account and monitoring
framework unleashes multiple possibilities for researchers
who want to further study the behavior of attackers in
webmail accounts. For this reason, we will release the
source code of our system upon publication of this pa-
per and will release it publicly.
3.2 Experiment setup
As part of our experiments, we first set up a number
of honey accounts on Gmail, and then leaked them on
multiple outlets used by cybercriminals.
Honey account setup. We created 100 Gmail ac-
counts and assigned them random combinations of pop-
ular first and last names, similar to what was done
in [25]. Creating and setting up these accounts is a
manual process, and this is why it was not possible for
us to create more than 100 accounts. Besides, Google
rate-limits the opening of new accounts from the same
IP address by presenting a phone verification page af-
ter a few accounts have been created. This limits the
number of honey accounts we can set up in practice.
We populated the freshly-created accounts with emails
from the public Enron email dataset [19]. This dataset
contains the emails sent by the executives of the energy
corporation Enron and was publicly released as evidence
for the bankruptcy trial of the company. This dataset
is suitable for our purposes, since the emails that it
contains are the typical emails exchanged by corporate
users. To make the honey accounts believable and avoid
raising suspicion from cybercriminals accessing them,
we mapped distinct recipients in the Enron dataset to
our fictional characters, and replaced the original first
names and last names in the dataset with our honey
first names and last names. In addition, we changed
all instances of “Enron” to a fictitious company name
that we came up with, and updated all dates contained
in the emails to reflect the time in which the accounts
were populated.
Leaking account credentials. To achieve our objec-
tives, we had to entice cybercriminals to interact with
our account honeypots, while we logged their accesses.
We selected paste sites and underground forums as ap-
propriate venues for leaking account credentials, since
they tend to be misused by cybercriminals for dissemi-
nation of stolen credentials. We also decided to set up
virtual machines and perform logins to honey accounts
after infecting them with information-stealing malware,
since this is a popular way in which professional cyber-
criminals obtain access to stolen accounts [9]. Infor-
mation stealing malware collects users’ form data, and
uploads it to the C&C server.
We divided the account honeypots in groups and leaked
their credentials in different locations, as shown in Ta-
ble 1. We leaked 50 accounts in total on paste sites. For
20 of them we leaked basic credentials (username and
password pairs) on the popular paste sites pastebin.com
and pastie.org. We then leaked 10 account creden-
tials on popular Russian paste websites (p.for-us.nl
and paste.org.ru). For the remaining 20 accounts we
leaked username and password pairs along with location
and date of birth information of the fictional character
that “owned” each account. We specified locations close
to London, UK for 10 of them, while we specified loca-
tions in the Midwest of the US for the other 10 accounts.
By averaging the longitude and latitude of these loca-
tions, the middle point falls in Pontiac, Illinois.
group number
of honey
accounts
outlet of leak
1 30 popular paste websites (no loca-
tion information)
2 20 popular paste websites (includ-
ing location information)
3 10 underground forums (no location
information)
4 20 underground forums (including
location information)
5 20 malware (no location informa-
tion)
Table 1: List of account honeypot groupings and where
we leaked them.
We leaked 30 account credentials on underground fo-
rums. For 10 of them we only specified username and
password pairs, without additional information. Simi-
lar to what was done for paste sites, we leaked a group
of 10 accounts each with additional information that
claimed that the “owners” of such accounts were based
near London, UK and in Midwestern US cities with a
middle point in Pontiac, respectively. To leak creden-
tials, we used these forums: offensivecommunity.net,
bestblackhatforums.eu, hackforums.net,
and blackhatworld.com. We selected these forums be-
cause they were open for anybody to register, and were
highly ranked in Google results. We acknowledge that
some underground forums are not open, and have a
strict vetting policy to let users in [24]. Unfortunately,
however, we did not have access to any private forum.
In addition, the same approach of studying open un-
derground forums has been used by previous work [6].
When leaking credentials on underground forums, we
mimicked the modus operandi of cybercriminals that
was outlined by Stone-Gross et al. in [24]. In this pa-
per, the authors showed that cybercriminals often post
a sample of their stolen datasets on the forum to show
that the accounts are real, and promise to provide ad-
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ditional data in exchange for a fee. We logged the mes-
sages that the accounts we created received on under-
ground forums, mostly inquiring about obtaining the
full dataset, but we did not follow up to them.
Finally, to study activity of information-stealing mal-
ware in honey accounts, we leaked basic credentials of
20 accounts to information-stealing malware samples,
using the malware honeypot infrastructure described in
the following section. To this end, we selected malware
samples from the Zeus family, which is one of the most
popular malware families performing information steal-
ing [9], as well as from the Corebot family. We will
provide detailed information on our malware honeypot
infrastructure in the next section.
The reason for leaking different accounts on different
outlets is to study differences in the behavior of cyber-
criminals getting access to stolen credentials through
different sources. The reason for providing different ad-
ditional information (in some cases, no additional in-
formation) across the different groups is to observe dif-
ferences in malicious activity depending on the amount
and type of information available to the cybercriminal.
As we will show in Section 4, the accesses that were
observed in our honey accounts were heavily influenced
by the presence of additional location information in
the leaked content.
Malware honeypot infrastructure. We set up a
sandbox and infected it with malware samples; these
samples captured the credentials that a web browser
was using to login on Gmail. Our sandbox works as fol-
lows: a web server entity manages the honey credentials
(usernames and passwords) and malware samples; once
the host creates the Virtual Machine (VM), it sends
a request to the web server for the malware executable
file and another one for the honey credential. The struc-
ture is similar to the one explained in [17]. The malware
sample is then executed; after a timeout, a script car-
ries out the login operation using the downloaded cre-
dential, in order to expose the honey credential to the
malware that is already running in the VM. After a cer-
tain lifetime the VM is deleted and a new one is created;
this new VM downloads another malware sample and
different credential, and repeats the login operation.
To maximize the efficiency of the configuration, be-
fore the experiment we carried out a test without the
Gmail login component to select only samples whose
C&C servers were still up and running. To avoid con-
tributing to spam campaigns or other malicious actions
we set up a sinkhole server and followed other prudent
practices described by [22], such as limiting the band-
width of the network interfaces to avoid Denial of Ser-
vice attacks, and limiting the lifetime of each VM.
3.3 Threats to validity
We acknowledge that seeding the honey accounts with
emails from the Enron dataset may introduce bias into
our results, and may make the honey accounts less be-
lievable to visitors. Another threat to validity is that
the honey accounts were pre-populated with emails, and
we did not send more emails to them while leaking
them. Some visitors may notice that the honey ac-
counts did not receive any new emails during the period
of observation, and this may affect our results. Finally,
since we only leaked honey credentials to the outlets
listed previously (namely paste sites, underground fo-
rums, and malware), our results reflect the activity of
participants on present on those outlets only. Besides,
in the case of the underground forums, it is possible that
the sophisticated cybercriminals from the underground
forums did not interact with our honey accounts. This
is because we leaked credentials through freshly created
accounts on those forums, and freshly created accounts
lack the level of high reputation it takes to interact
with sophisticated cybercriminals in the underground
forums. We also acknowledge that to generalize our
findings, we would require more than 100 Gmail ac-
counts.
Despite these issues, we believe that our methodology
will help researchers to further understand the under-
ground economy of stolen accounts, and that our results
shed light into what happens to stolen accounts. It is
currently hard to gather data on compromised accounts,
and our system provides a novel way to do so, especially
for researchers. Our methodology can be applied to
other online accounts, for instance, those hosting doc-
uments, and our results can be used in the process of
building tools to detect and mitigate illegitimate ac-
cesses to online accounts. As it can be seen, our results
already show interesting trends and findings, which we
intend to explore further in future work.
3.4 Ethics
The experiments performed in this paper require some
ethical considerations. First of all, by giving access to
our honey accounts to cybercriminals, we incur the risk
that these accounts will be used to damage third par-
ties. To minimize this risk, as we said, we configured our
accounts in a way that all emails would be forwarded
to a sinkhole mailserver under our control and never
delivered to the outside world. We also established a
close collaboration with Google and made sure to re-
port to them any malicious activity that needed atten-
tion. Although the suspicious login filters that Google
typically uses to protect their accounts from unautho-
rized accessed were disabled for our honey accounts, all
other malicious activity detection algorithms were still
in place, and in fact Google suspended a number of ac-
counts under our control that attempted to send spam.
To mitigate the possibility of cybercriminals finding our
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honey scripts, deleting them, and locking us out of the
honey accounts we provided Google with a full list of
our honey accounts, so that they could monitor them in
case something went wrong. Another point of risk is en-
suring that the malware ran in our virtual environment
would not be put in condition to harm third parties.
As we said, we followed common practices [22] such as
restricting the bandwidth available to our virtual ma-
chines and sinkholing all email traffic sent by them. Fi-
nally, our experiments are inherently deceiving cyber-
criminals by providing them fake accounts with fake
personal information in them. To make sure that our
experiments were ran in an ethical fashion, we sought
and obtained IRB approval by our institution.
4. DATA ANALYSIS
We monitored the activity on our honey accounts for
a period of 7 months, from 25th June, 2015 to 16th
February, 2016. In this section, we first provide a tax-
onomy of the types of activity that we observed. We
provide a detailed analysis of the type of activity moni-
tored on our honey accounts, focusing on the differences
in modus operandi shown by cybercriminals who obtain
credentials to our honey accounts from different outlets.
We then investigate whether cybercriminals attempt to
evade location-based detection systems by connecting
from locations that are closer to where the owner of ac-
count typically connects from. We also develop a met-
ric to infer which keywords attackers search for when
looking for interesting information in an email account.
Finally, we analyze how certain types of cybercriminals
appear to be stealthier and more advanced than others.
4.1 Overview
We created and instrumented 100 Gmail accounts
for our experiments. We observed 327 unique accesses
to the accounts during the experiment, during which
147 emails were read, 845 emails were sent, and there
were 12 unique draft emails composed by cybercrimi-
nals. To avoid biasing our results, we removed all ac-
cesses made to honey accounts by IP addresses from
our monitoring infrastructure. We also removed all ac-
cesses that originated from the city where our monitor-
ing infrastructure is located. 42 accounts were blocked
by Google during the course of the experiment, since
the cybercriminals that accessed them violated Google’s
Terms and Conditions while doing so.We developed a
taxonomy of cybercriminals accessing the honey accounts,
which we explain in detail in the next section.
4.2 A taxonomy of account activity
From our dataset of activity observed in the honey
accounts, we devise a taxonomy of attackers based on
unique accesses to such accounts. We identify four types
of attackers, described in detail in the following.
Curious. These accesses constitute the most basic
type of access to stolen accounts. After getting hold
of account credentials, people login on those accounts
to check if such credentials work. Afterward, they do
not perform any additional action. The majority of the
observed accesses belong to this category, accounting
for 224 accesses.
Gold Diggers. When getting access to a stolen ac-
count, attackers often want to understand its worth.
For this reason, on logging into honey accounts, some
attackers search for sensitive information, such as ac-
count information and attachments that have financial-
related names. They also seek information that may
be useful in spearphishing attacks. We call these ac-
cesses “gold diggers.” Previous research showed that
this practice is quite common for manual account hi-
jackers [11]. In this paper, we confirm that finding,
provide a methodology to assess the keywords that cy-
bercriminals search for, and analyze differences in the
modus operandi of gold digger accesses for credentials
leaked through different outlets. In total, we observed
82 accesses of this type.
Spammers. One of the main capabilities of webmail
accounts is sending emails. Previous research showed
that large spamming botnets have code in their bots
and in their C&C infrastructure to take advantage of
this capability, by having the bots directly connect to
such accounts and send spam [24]. We consider accesses
to belong to this category if they send any email. We
observed 8 accounts of this type. This low number of
accesses shows that sending spam appears not to be
one of the main purposes that cybercriminals use stolen
accounts for.
Hijackers. A stealthy cybercriminal is likely to keep
a low profile when accessing a stolen account, to avoid
raising suspicion from the account’s legitimate owner.
Less concerned miscreants, however, might just act to
lock the legitimate owner out of their account by chang-
ing the account’s password. We call these accesses “hi-
jackers.” In total, we observed 36 accesses of this type.
It is interesting to note that a change of password pre-
vents us from scraping the accesses page, and therefore
we are unable to collect further information about the
accesses performed to that account. However, since the
password to the account now does not match the leaked
one, it is reasonable to assume that the person perform-
ing further logins to such honey accounts is now either
the hijacker himself, or someone that the hijacker gave
(perhaps sold) the account credentials to. Interestingly,
even after losing control of the accounts, our monitor-
ing scripts embedded in the accounts keep running, and
therefore we keep receiving information on the emails
that are read, sent, or starred in that account.
It is important to note that the taxonomy classes that
we described are not exclusive. For example, an at-
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Figure 1: CDF of the length of unique accesses for dif-
ferent types of activity on our honey accounts.
tacker might change the password of an account, there-
fore falling into the “hijacker” category and then use
it to send spam emails, therefore falling in the “spam-
mer” category too. Such overlaps happened often for
the accesses recorded in our honey accounts. It is in-
teresting to note that there was no access that behaved
exclusively as “spammer.” Miscreants who sent spam
through our honey accounts also acted as “hijackers” or
as “gold diggers,” searching for sensitive information in
the account.
Figure 1 shows plots of the Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) of the length of accesses of different
types of attackers. As for the previous analysis, these
accesses identify cookies, and account for the time be-
tween the first and the last time a cookie is observed
on a certain honey account. As it can be seen, the vast
majority of accesses are very short, lasting only a few
minutes and never coming back. “Spammer” accounts,
in particular, tend to send emails in burst for a cer-
tain period and then disconnect. “Hijacker” and “gold
digger” accesses, on the other hand, have a long tail of
about 10% accesses that keep coming back for several
days in a row. For “hijacker” accesses, the statistics
reported are only a lower bound of the actual time that
a cookie was active on an account: as we said, after the
account password is changed, we lose the capability of
tracking accesses (but not the information on the in-
teraction with the accounts, for example which emails
were read). The CDF shows that most “curious” ac-
cesses are repeated over many days, indicating that the
cybercriminals keep coming back to find out if there is
new information in the accounts. This conflicts with
the finding in [11], which states that most cybercrimi-
nals connect to a compromised webmail account once,
to assess its value within a few minutes. However, [11]
focused only accounts compromised via phishing pages,
Figure 2: Distribution of types of accesses for different
credential leak accesses.
while we have on a broader threat model, as earlier
stated.
We wanted to understand the distribution of different
types of accesses in accounts that were leaked through
different means. Figure 2 shows a breakdown of this dis-
tribution. As it can be seen, cybercriminals who get ac-
cess to stolen accounts through malware are the stealth-
iest, and never lock the legitimate users out of their
account. Instead, they limit their activity to check-
ing if such credentials are real or searching for sensi-
tive information in the account inbox, perhaps in an at-
tempt to estimate the value of the accounts. Accounts
leaked through paste sites and underground forums see
the presence of “hijackers.” 20% of the accesses to ac-
counts leaked through paste sites, in particular, belong
to this category. Accounts leaked through underground
forums, on the other hand, see the highest percentage
of “gold digger” accesses, with about 30% of all accesses
belonging to this category.
4.3 Activity on honey accounts
Google identifies each access to a Gmail account with
a cookie identifier. For each unique access observed in
each account honeypot, we recorded the cookie identi-
fier, the time of first access as t0, and the time of last
known access as tlast. In the case of repeated accesses
with the same cookie identifier (i.e., multiple visits by
the same attacker), we chose tlast as the time of the last
recorded visit, while t0 remains the time of first access.
From this information, we computed the duration of ac-
tivity as tlast − t0 per cookie. The majority of accesses
are short, especially in groups leaked on paste sites and
underground forums. We observed that 80% of visi-
tors to accounts leaked on paste sites and underground
forums never came back after their first accesses, while
80% of visitors to accounts leaked to malware came back
after some days.
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Figure 3: CDF of the time passed after account cre-
dentials are leaked and the first access by a cookie is
recorded.
We also studied how long it takes for cybercriminals
to access accounts in the different groups, after we leak
them. We measured the duration between time of first
leak in each group, and the time of first access. We
generated a CDF to compare durations across malware,
paste sites and underground forums, as shown in Fig-
ure 3. Similarly, we generated a time-based plot of ac-
tivity in the honey accounts, by computing duration
between time of first leak in each group, and the time
of unique access. This is shown in Figure 4. The idea
is to identify time patterns of unique accesses.
Figure 3 shows that within the first 25 days, the fol-
lowing were recorded: 80% of all unique accesses to ac-
counts leaked to paste sites, 60% of all unique accesses
to accounts leaked to underground forums, and 40%
of all unique accesses to accounts leaked to malware.
A particularly interesting observation is the nature of
unique accesses to accounts leaked to malware. A close
look at Figure 3 reveals rapid increases in unique ac-
cesses to honey accounts leaked to malware, about 30
days after the leak, and also after 100 days, indicated
by 2 sharp inflection points.
Figure 4 sheds more light into what happened at
those points. An interesting aspect to note is that
accounts that are leaked on public outlets such as fo-
rum and paste sites can be accessed by multiple cyber-
criminals at the same time. Account credentials leaked
through malware, on the other hand, are available only
to the botmaster that stole them, until they decide to
sell them or to give them to someone else. Seeing bursts
in accesses to accounts leaked through malware months
after the actual leak happened could indicate that the
accounts were aggregated by the same criminal from
different C&C servers or that the accounts were sold
on the underground market and that another criminal
is now using them. This hypothesis is somewhat con-
Figure 4: Plot of duration between time of leak and
unique accesses in accounts leaked through different
outlets.
firmed by the fact that these bursts in accesses were
of the “gold digger” type, while all previous accesses
to the same accounts were of the “curious” type. An-
other interesting fact shown by Figure 4 is that accounts
leaked to malware are accessed multiple times by the
malware controllers who stole them, perhaps to check
whether the accounts are active. As discussed previ-
ously, this is in contrast with what was discovered by
previous work [11].
In addition, Figure 4 shows that majority of accounts
leaked to paste sites were accessed within a few days of
leak, while a particular subset was not accessed for more
than 2 months. That subset refers to the 10 creden-
tials we leaked to Russian paste sites. The correspond-
ing honey accounts were not accessed for more than 2
months from the time of leak. This either indicates that
cybercriminals are not many on the Russian paste sites,
or they maybe they did not believe that the accounts
were real, thus not bothering to access them.
4.4 System configuration of accesses
Using Google’s system fingerprinting information avail-
able in the honey accounts, we collected information
about devices that accessed the honey accounts. Ac-
counts leaked through paste sites and underground fo-
rums recorded a fraction of accesses from Android de-
vices, while the accounts leaked through malware only
recorded accesses from traditional computers. On the
browser side we notice that accesses on accounts leaked
through malware always consisted of an empty user
agent, making it impossible for Google to identify the
browser. Accounts leaked through underground forums
and paste sites, on the other hand, present accesses from
all the most popular browsers.
4.5 Location of accesses
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We recorded the location information that we found
in 173 unique accesses, and analyzed them to identify
differences in origin location patterns across honey ac-
count groups. This was possible because Google pro-
vides location information (that is, the city from which
a user logged into a Gmail account) in the account ac-
tivity page of each Gmail account. 154 unique accesses
did not have location information in them. According
to information we got from Google, they are mostly ac-
cesses that originated from Tor exit nodes or anonymous
proxies.
We observed accesses from a total of 29 countries. To
understand whether the IP addresses that connected
to our honey accounts had been recorded in previous
malicious activity, we ran checks on all IP addresses
we observed, against Spamhaus blacklist. We found
20 IP addresses that accessed our honey accounts in the
Spamhaus blacklist. Because of the nature of this black-
list, we believe that the addresses belong to malware-
infected machines that are used by cybercriminals to
connect to the stolen accounts.
One of our goals was to observe if cybercriminals at-
tempt to evade location-based login risk analysis sys-
tems by tweaking access origins. In particular, we wanted
to assess whether telling criminals the location where
the owner of an account is based influences the loca-
tions that they will use to connect to this account. De-
spite observing 57 accesses to our honey accounts leaked
through malware, we discovered that all these connec-
tions except one originated from Tor exit nodes. This
shows that malware operators prefer to hide their lo-
cation through the use of anonymizing systems rather
than modifying their location based on where the stolen
account is typically connecting from. Because of this
observation, we focused the further experiments in this
section on the accounts that are stolen through paste
sites and underground forums.
To observe the impact of availability of location infor-
mation about the honey accounts on the locations that
cybercriminals connect from, we calculated the median
values of distances of the locations recorded in unique
accesses, from the midpoints of the advertised locations
in our account leaks. As we mentioned, the midpoint of
advertised UK locations is London, while the midpoint
of the advertised US locations is in Pontiac, Illinois. For
example, for all unique accesses A to honey accounts
leaked on paste sites, advertised with UK information,
we extracted location information, translated them to
coordinates LA, and computed dist paste UK vector as
distance(LA,midUK), where midUK is London’s coor-
dinates. All distances are in kilometers. We extracted
the median values of all distance vectors obtained, and
plotted circles on UK and US maps, specifying those
median distances as radii of the circles, as shown in
Figures 5a and 5b.
Interestingly, we observe that connections to accounts
with advertised location information originate from places
closer to the midpoints than accounts with leaked infor-
mation containing usernames and passwords only. Fig-
ure 5a shows that connections to accounts leaked on
paste sites result in the smaller median circles, that is,
the connections originate from locations closer to Lon-
don, the UK midpoint. The smallest circle is for the
accounts leaked on paste sites, with advertised UK loca-
tion information (radius 1400 kilometers). In contrast,
the circle of accounts leaked on paste sites without lo-
cation information has a radius of 1784 kilometers. The
median circle of the accounts leaked in underground fo-
rums, with no advertised location information, is the
largest circle in Figure 5a, while the one of accounts
leaked in underground forums, along with UK location
information, is smaller.
We obtained similar results in US plot, with some
interesting distinctions. As shown in Figure 5b, con-
nections to honey accounts leaked on paste sites, with
advertised US locations are clustered around the US
midpoint, as indicated by the circle with a radius of
939 kilometers, compared to the the median circle of
accounts leaked on paste sites without location infor-
mation, that has a radius of 7900 kilometers. How-
ever, despite the fact that the median circle of accounts
leaked in underground forums with advertised location
information is less than that of the one without adver-
tised location information, the difference in their radii
is not much. This again supports the indication that
cybercriminals on paste sites exhibit more location mal-
leability, that is, masquerading their origins of accesses
to appear closer to the advertised location, when pro-
vided. It also shows that cybercriminals on forums are
less sophisticated, or care less than the ones on paste
sites.
Statistical significance. As we explained, Figures 5a
and 5b show that accesses to leaked accounts happen
closer to advertised locations if this information is in-
cluded in the leak. To confirm this finding we performed
a Cramer Von Mises test [12]. The Anderson version [7]
of this test is used to understand if two vectors of values
are likely have the same statistical distribution or not.
The p value has to be under 0.01 to let us state that it is
possible to reject the null hypothesis (i.e. the two vec-
tors of distances have the same distribution), otherwise
it is not possible to state with statistical significance
if the two distance vectors are derived from the same
distribution.
The p value from the test on paste sites vectors (val-
ues 0.0017415 for UK location information versus no
location and 0.0000007 for US location information ver-
sus no location) allows us to reject the null hypothesis
stating that the two vectors come from different dis-
tributions while we cannot say the same observing the
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(a) Distance of login locations from the UK midpoint (b) Distance of login locations from the US midpoint
Figure 5: Distance of login locations from the midpoints of locations advertised while leaking credentials. Red
lines indicate credentials leaked on paste sites with no location information, green lines indicate credentials leaked
on paste sites with location information, purple lines indicate credentials leaked on underground forums without
location information, while blue lines indicate credentials leaked on underground forums with location information.
p values for the tests on forum vectors (0.272883 in
the UK case and 0.272011 in the US one). Therefore,
we can conclusively state that the statistical test proves
that criminals using paste sites connect from closer loca-
tions when location information is provided along with
the leaked credentials. We cannot reach that conclusion
in the case of accounts leaked to underground forums,
although Figures 5a and 5b indicate that there are some
location differences in this case too.
4.6 What are “gold diggers” looking for?
Cybercriminals compromise online accounts due to
the inherent value of those accounts. As a result, they
assess accounts to decide how valuable they are, to de-
cide exactly what to do with such accounts. We decided
to study the words that they searched for in the honey
accounts, in order to understand and potentially char-
acterize anomalous searches in the accounts, to aid the
design of detection systems in the future. A limiting
factor in this case was the fact that we did not have
access to search logs of the honey accounts, but only to
the content of the emails that were read. To overcome
this limitation, we employed Term Frequency–Inverse
Document Frequency (TF-IDF). TF-IDF is a product
of two metrics, namely Term Frequency (TF) and In-
verse Document Frequency (IDF). The idea is that we
can infer the words that cybercriminals searched for, by
comparing the important words in the emails read by
cybercriminals to the important words in all emails in
the decoy accounts. TF-IDF is used to rank words in a
corpus, by importance. As a result we relied on TF-IDF
to infer the words that cybercriminals searched for in
the honey accounts.
In its simplest form, TF is a measure of how fre-
quently term t is found in document d, as shown in
Equation 1. IDF is a logarithmic scaling of the fraction
of the number of documents containing term t, as shown
in Equation 2 where D is the set of all documents in the
corpus, N is the total number of documents in the cor-
pus, |d ∈ D : t ∈ d| is the number of documents in D,
that contain term t. Once TF and IDF are obtained,
TF-IDF is computed by multiplying TF and IDF, as
shown in Equation 3.
tf(t, d) = ft,d (1)
idf(t,D) = log
N
|d ∈ D : t ∈ d| (2)
tfidf(t, d,D) = tf(t, d)× idf(t,D) (3)
The output of TF-IDF is a weighted metric that ranges
between 0 and 1. The closer the weighted value is to 1,
the more important the term is, in the corpus.
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Searched words tfidfR tfidfA tfidfR − tfidfA Common words tfidfR tfidfA tfidfR − tfidfA
results 0.2250 0.0127 0.2122 transfer 0.2795 0.2949 -0.0154
bitcoin 0.1904 0.0 0.1904 please 0.2116 0.2608 -0.0493
family 0.1624 0.0200 0.1423 original 0.1387 0.1540 -0.0154
seller 0.1333 0.0037 0.1296 company 0.042 0.1531 -0.1111
localbitcoins 0.1009 0.0 0.1009 would 0.0864 0.1493 -0.063
account 0.1114 0.0247 0.0866 energy 0.0618 0.1471 -0.0853
payment 0.0982 0.0157 0.0824 information 0.0985 0.1308 -0.0323
bitcoins 0.0768 0.0 0.07684 about 0.1342 0.1226 0.0116
below 0.1236 0.0496 0.074 email 0.1402 0.1196 0.0207
listed 0.0858 0.02068 0.0651 power 0.0462 0.1175 -0.0713
Table 2: List of top 10 words by tfidfR− tfidfA (on the left) and list of top 10 words by tfidfA (on the right). The
words on the left are the ones that have the highest difference in importance between the emails read by attackers
and the emails in the entire corpus. For this reason, they are the words that attackers most likely searched for when
looking for sensitive information in the stolen accounts. The words on the right, on the other hand, are the ones
that have the highest importance in the entire corpus.
We evaluated TF-IDF on all terms in a corpus of text
comprising two documents, namely, all emails dA in the
honey accounts, and all emails dR read by the attackers.
The idea is that the words that have a large importance
in the emails that have been read by a criminal, but
have a lower importance in the overall dataset, are likely
to be keywords that the attackers searched for on the
Gmail site. We preprocessed the corpus by filtering out
all words that have less than 5 characters, and removing
all known header-related words, for instance “delivered”
and “charset,” honey email handles, and also removing
signaling information that our monitoring infrastruc-
ture introduced into the emails. After running TF-IDF
on all remaining terms in the corpus, we obtained their
TF-IDF values as vectors TFIDFA and TFIDFR, the
TF-IDF values of all terms in the corpus [dA, dR]. We
proceeded to compute the vector TFIDFR−TFIDFA.
The top 10 words by TFIDFR − TFIDFA, compared
to the top 10 words by TFIDFA, is presented in Ta-
ble 2. The idea is that words that have TFIDFR values
that are higher than TFIDFA will rank higher in the
list, and those are the words that the cybercriminals
likely searched for.
As seen in Table 2, the top 10 important words by
TFIDFR−TFIDFA are sensitive words, such as “bit-
coin,” “family,” and “payment.” These top 10 words
constitute words with the greatest difference importance
between the emails read by attackers, and all emails
in the corpus. Comparing these words with the most
important words in the entire corpus reveals the indi-
cation that attackers likely searched for sensitive infor-
mation, especially financial information. In addition,
words with the highest importance in the entire corpus
(for example, “company” and “energy”), shown in the
right side of Table 2, have much lower importance in
the emails read by cybercriminals, and most of them
have negative values in TFIDFR − TFIDFA. This is
a strong indicator that the honey accounts were not
searched for random terms, but were searched for sen-
sitive information.
Originally, the Enron dataset had no “bitcoin” term.
However, that term was introduced into the read emails
document dR, through the actions of one of the cyber-
criminals that accessed some of the honey accounts.
The cybercriminal attempted to send blackmail mes-
sages from some of our honey accounts to Ashley Madi-
son scandal victims, requesting ransoms in bitcoin, in
exchange for silence. In the process, a lot of draft
emails containing information about ‘bitcoin’ were cre-
ated and abandoned by the cybercriminal, and other
cybercriminals read them during later accesses. That
way, our monitoring infrastructure picked up ‘bitcoin’
related terms, and they rank high in Table 2, showing
that cybercriminals showed a lot of interest in those
emails.
4.7 Interesting case studies
In this section, we present some interesting case stud-
ies we encountered during our experiments. They help
to shed further light into actions that cybercriminals
take on compromised webmail accounts.
Three of the honey accounts were used by an attacker
to send multiple blackmail messages to some victims of
the Ashley Madison scandal. The blackmailer threat-
ened to expose the victims, unless they made some pay-
ments in bitcoin to a specified bitcoin wallet. Tuto-
rials on how to make bitcoin payments were also in-
cluded in the messages. The blackmailer also created
and abandoned many drafts emails targeted at more
Ashley Madison victims, which some other visitors to
the accounts read, thus contributing to read content
that our monitoring infrastructure recorded.
Two of the honey accounts received notification emails
about the hidden Google Apps Script in both honey
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accounts “using too much computer time.” The no-
tifications were read by an attacker, and we received
notifications about the reading actions.
Finally, an attacker registered on an carding forum
using one of the honey accounts as registration email
address. As a result, registration confirmation infor-
mation was sent to the honey account This shows that
some of the accounts were used as stepping stones by
cybercriminals to perform other attacks.
4.8 Sophistication of attackers
From the accesses we recorded in the honey accounts,
we identified 3 peculiar behaviors of cybercriminals that
indicate their level of sophistication, namely, configura-
tion hiding - for instance by hiding user agent informa-
tion, detection evading - by connecting from locations
close to the advertised decoy location if provided, and
stealth - avoiding actions like hijacking and spamming.
Attackers accessing the different groups of honey ac-
counts exhibit different types of sophistication. Those
accessing accounts leaked through malware are more
stealthy than others - they don’t hijack the accounts,
and they don’t send spam from the accounts. They also
access the accounts through Tor, and they hide their
system configuration, for instance, there was no user
agent string information in the accesses we recorded
from them. Attackers accessing accounts leaked on paste
sites tend to connect from locations closer to the ones
specified as decoy locations in the leaked account. They
do this in a bid to evade detection. Attackers access-
ing accounts leaked in underground forums don’t make
much attempts to stay stealthy or to connect from closer
locations. These differences in sophistication could be
used to characterize attacker behavior.
5. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the implications of the
findings we made in this paper. First, we talk about
what our findings mean for current mitigation tech-
niques against compromised online service accounts, and
how they could be used to devise better defenses. Then,
we talk about some limitations of our method. Finally,
we present some ideas for future work.
Implications of our findings. In this paper, we made
multiple findings that provide the research community
with a better understanding of what happens when on-
line accounts get compromised. In particular, we dis-
covered that if attackers are provided location informa-
tion about the online accounts they then tend to con-
nect from places that are closer to that advertised loca-
tion. We believe that this is an attempt to evade current
security mechanisms employed by online services to dis-
cover suspicious logins. Such systems often rely on the
origin of logins, to assess how suspicious those login at-
tempts are. Our findings cast some doubts on the effec-
tiveness of such suspicious login anomaly detection sys-
tems, especially in the presence of skilled attackers. We
also observed that many accesses were received through
proxies and Tor exit nodes, so it is hard to determine
the exact origins of logins. This problem renders these
security mechanisms less effective.
Despite confirming existing evasion techniques in use
by cybercriminals, our experiments also highlighted in-
teresting behaviors that could be used to develop effec-
tive systems to detect malicious activity. For example,
our observations about the words searched for by the cy-
bercriminals show that behavioral modeling could work
in identifying anomalous behavior in online accounts.
Anomaly detection systems could be trained adaptively
on words being searched for over a period of time, by the
legitimate account owner. A deviation of searches from
those words would then be flagged as anomalous, indi-
cating that the account may have been compromised.
Similarly, anomaly detection systems could be trained
on durations of connections during benign usage, and
deviations from those could be flagged as anomalous.
Limitations. We encountered a number of limitations
in the course of the experiments. For example, we were
able to leak the honey accounts only on a few outlets,
namely paste sites, underground forums and malware.
In particular, we could only target underground forums
that were open to the public and for which registration
was free. Similarly, we could not study some of the most
recent families of information-stealing malware such as
Dridex, because they would not execute in our virtual
environment.
Attackers could find the scripts we hid in the honey
accounts and remove them, making it impossible for us
to monitor the activity of the account. This is an in-
trinsic limitation of our monitoring architecture, but in
principle studies similar to ours could be performed by
the online service providers themselves, such as Google
and Facebook. By having access to the full logs of their
systems, such entities would have no need of setting
up monitoring scripts, and it would be impossible for
attackers to evade their scrutiny.
Future work. In the future, we plan to continue ex-
ploring the ecosystem of stolen accounts, and gaining a
better understanding of the underground economy sur-
rounding them. We would explore ways to make the de-
coy accounts more believable, in order to attract more
cybercriminals and keep them engaged with the decoy
accounts. We intend to set up additional scenarios, such
as studying attackers who have a specific motivation, for
example compromising accounts that belong to politi-
cal activists (rather then generic corporate accounts, as
we did in this paper). We want to study the modus
operandi of cybercriminals taking over other types of
accounts, such as Online Social Networks (OSNs) and
cloud storage accounts. We could modify and adapt
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the monitoring infrastructure that we already have to
other types of accounts. We also plan to devise a wider
taxonomy of attackers in the future.
6. RELATED WORK
In this section, we briefly compare this paper with
previous work, noting that most previous work focused
on spam and social spam. Only a few focused on manual
hijacking of accounts and their activity.
Bursztein et al. [11] investigated manual hijacking of
online accounts, through phishing pages. The study fo-
cuses on cybercriminals who steal user credentials and
use them privately, and shows that manual hijacking
is not as common as automated hijacking by botnets.
The study illustrates the usefulness of honey credentials
(account honeypots), in the study of hijacked accounts.
Compared to the work by Bursztein et al., in this pa-
per we analyze a much broader threat model, looking
at account credentials automatically stolen by malware,
as well as the behavior of cybercriminals who obtain
account credentials through underground forums and
paste sites. By focusing on multiple types of miscre-
ants, we were able to show differences in their modus
operandi, and provide multiple insights on the activities
that happen on hijacked Gmail accounts in the wild. In
addition, we provide an open source framework that
can be used by other researchers to set up experiments
similar to ours and further explore the ecosystem of
stolen Google accounts. Despite the fact that the au-
thors of [11] had more visibility on the account hijacking
phenomenon than we did, since they were operating the
Gmail service, the dataset that we collected is of com-
parable size to theirs: we logged 327 malicious accesses
to 100 accounts, while they studied 575 high-confidence
hijacked accounts.
Thomas et al. [28] studied Twitter accounts under
the control of spammers. Stringhini et al. [25] studied
social spam using 300 honeypot profiles, and presented
a tool for detection of spam on Facebook and Twit-
ter. Similar work was also carried out in [8, 10, 20, 32].
Egele et al. [14] presented a system that detects mali-
cious activity in online social networks by building sta-
tistical models of “normal” behavior patterns of users.
Stringhini et al. [26] developed a tool for spearphishing
detection based on behavioral modeling of senders.
Stone-Gross et al. [24] studied a large-scale spam op-
eration by analyzing 16 C&C servers of Pushdo/Cutwail
botnet. In the paper, the authors highlight that the
Cutwail botnet, one of the largest of its time, has the
capability of connecting to webmail accounts to send
spam. This capability seemed not to be used by cyber-
criminals at the time of the study. During our measure-
ment we did not observe any mass-sending email activ-
ity that might make us think our honey accounts were
used by a large botnet to automatically send spam. In
their paper, Stone-Gross et al. also describe the activity
of cybercriminals on spamdot, a large underground fo-
rum. They show that cybercriminals were actively trad-
ing account information such as the one provided in this
paper, providing free “teasers” of the overall datasets
for sale. In this paper, we used a similar approach to
leak account credentials on underground forums.
Thomas et al. [29] studied underground markets in
which fake Twitter accounts are sold and then used to
spread spam and other malicious content. Unlike this
paper, they focus on fake accounts and not on legitimate
ones that have been hijacked. Wang et al. [30] proposed
the use of patterns of click events to spot fake accounts
in online services, by building clickstream models of real
users and fake accounts. In 2012, Liu et al. [21] studied
content privacy issues in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks,
by deploying honeyfiles containing honey account cre-
dentials in P2P shared spaces. They monitored down-
loading events and concluded that attackers that down-
loaded the honeyfiles had malicious intent, to make eco-
nomic gain from the private data they obtained. The
study used a similar approach to ours, especially in the
placement of honey account credentials. However, they
placed more emphasis on honeyfiles than honey creden-
tials. Besides, they studied P2P networks while our
work focuses on compromised accounts in the World
Wide Web (WWW). Kapravelos et al. [18] studied mali-
cious browser extensions, and emphasized the huge risks
that malicious browser extensions pose to users. They
configured dynamic web pages as honeypots, to study
the behavior of browser extensions. On the other hand,
Wang et al. [31] investigated malicious web pages by
deploying VM-based honeypots that ran on vulnerable
operating systems, and patrolled the World Wide Web
to find malicious web pages.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a honey account system
able to monitor the activity of cybercriminals that gain
access to Gmail credentials. We will open source our
system, to encourage researchers to set up additional
experiments and improve the knowledge of our commu-
nity regarding what happens after an account is com-
promised. We set up 100 honey accounts, and leaked
them on paste sites, underground forums, and virtual
machines infected with malware. We measured the ac-
cesses received on our honey accounts for a period of
7 months, and provided detailed statistics of the activ-
ity of cybercriminals on these accounts, together with a
taxonomy of such criminals. Our findings help the re-
search community to get a better understanding of the
ecosystem of stolen online accounts, and will help re-
searchers develop better detection systems against this
malicious activity.
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